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Note
KOLBE V. HOGAN: HEWING TO HELLER AND
TAKING AIM AT A STANDARD OF STRICT SCRUTINY
FOR COMPREHENSIVE FIREARMS LEGISLATION
BRETT S. TURLINGTON
1

In Kolbe v. Hogan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considered whether Maryland’s Firearm Safety Act2 infringes upon
the right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment.3 The Fourth
Circuit held that the Firearm Safety Act’s assault weapon and large-capacity
magazine bans implicate the protections guaranteed by the Second
Amendment, and therefore these bans should be analyzed under a standard
of strict scrutiny.4 The court reached the correct conclusion in this case, in
part because it properly construed the “dangerous and unusual” language
from District of Columbia v. Heller5 that had been either misunderstood or
misapplied by other courts.6 Heller limited the right to keep and bear arms
to weapons “in common use at the time,” as supported by the historical
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1. 813 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016)
(mem).
2. Firearm Safety Act, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 4-301 to 4-306 (West Supp. 2015);
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-101 (West Supp. 2015); see Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 168–70
(providing background information on the Firearm Safety Act).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
4. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 168. See infra notes 123–129 and accompanying text (providing an
explanation of constitutional levels of scrutiny).
5. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
6. See infra Part IV.A.
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tradition of banning dangerous and unusual weapons.7 As explained in
Kolbe, Heller did not intend the “dangerous and unusual” language to act as
an independent limitation on the right to keep and bear arms, despite recent
decisions from other circuits.8 Furthermore, the court reached the correct
judgment because it reasoned that sweeping assault weapon and largecapacity magazine bans, like the Firearm Safety Act, demand strict
scrutiny.9 Such bans indiscriminately interfere with the core lawful purpose
of the Second Amendment, namely protecting the possession of firearms for
self-defense within the home.10 Other United States courts of appeals have
applied intermediate scrutiny to similar laws, which means Kolbe created a
circuit split.11 The cogent and compelling reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in
favor of applying strict scrutiny to broad firearm bans might produce
similar decisions in other circuits and, ultimately, spur the Supreme Court
of the United States to resolve the circuit split.12 On remand, if the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland applies strict scrutiny and
finds the Firearm Safety Act unconstitutional, state legislatures within the
Fourth Circuit will need to carefully craft future firearms legislation to
afford greater protection to the right to keep and bear arms.13
I. THE CASE
On May 16, 2013, the Governor of Maryland, Martin O’Malley,
signed into law the Firearm Safety Act.14 The Maryland General Assembly
passed the Firearm Safety Act in response to a series of mass shootings in
7. 554 U.S. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)); see also
Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027–28 (2016) (per curiam) (explaining that Heller’s
“common use at the time” limitation does not merely refer to arms in existence at time of the
founding, but more properly refers to all bearable arms, including newer weapons such as electric
stun guns).
8. See infra Part IV.A.2.
9. Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 179–80 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F.
App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem); see infra Part IV.B.
10. Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d at 179–80.
11. See infra notes 301–305 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. See infra Part IV.B. The Fourth Circuit originally remanded the case to the district court
to apply strict scrutiny to the Firearm Safety Act. Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d at 192.
Subsequently, the State requested a rehearing en banc. Kolbe v. Hogan, 636 F. App’x 880 (4th
Cir. 2016) (mem). The Fourth Circuit granted the State’s petition for a rehearing en banc and
heard oral arguments on May 11, 2016. Id. The court is expected to issue an opinion in 2017.
See, e.g., John Haughey, Top 10 Most Important Gun Rights Cases of 2016, OUTDOORLIFE (Dec.
28, 2016), http://www.outdoorlife.com/top-most-important-10-gun-related-court-cases-2016.
14. See generally Firearm Safety Act, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 4-301–4-306 (West
Supp. 2015) (providing the main text of the Firearm Safety Act); PUB. SAFETY § 5-101 (defining
an “assault long gun” and a “licensed firearms dealer” for the purposes of the Firearm Safety Act);
Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d 768, 774 (D. Md. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom.
Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. App’x 880 (4th Cir.
2016) (mem).
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other states, most notably the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in
Newtown, Connecticut.15 Key provisions within the act prohibited citizens
from possessing, selling, purchasing, or transferring enumerated assault
weapons and their copies, as well as large-capacity magazines.16
Possession or any other violation of the ban after October 1, 2013,
constituted a misdemeanor punishable by up to three years in prison.17 The
large-capacity magazine ban applied to magazines with a capacity of more
than ten rounds of ammunition and was virtually identical to the assault
weapon ban.18
The Firearm Safety Act criminalized the conduct and desired conduct
of numerous Maryland citizens and organizations.19 Named plaintiff
Stephen Kolbe owned a semi-automatic handgun banned by the Act and
would have purchased another semi-automatic firearm and several largecapacity magazines if not for the Firearm Safety Act.20 Plaintiff Andrew
Turner also owned a semi-automatic firearm banned by the Act and wanted
to purchase a semi-automatic rifle and more large-capacity magazines.21
Plaintiffs Wink’s Sporting Goods, Inc. and Atlantic Guns, Inc. relied on the
sale of firearms and magazines to support their respective businesses.22 A
number of trade, hunting, and gun-owners’ rights organizations also joined
in filing the complaint because they felt their rights and their members’
rights were restricted by the Firearm Safety Act.23
15. Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 774. In the Sandy Hook shooting, the gunman used
an assault rifle to claim the lives of twenty children and six adults. Id.; see also Connecticut
Shootings
Fast
Facts,
CNN
(Apr.
19,
2016,
4:11
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/07/us/connecticut-shootings-fast-facts/ (stating that the Sandy Hook
shooter used a semi-automatic Bushmaster rifle).
16. Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 775–76 (citing CRIM. LAW §§ 4-303(a), 4-305(b)).
The assault weapon ban applied to over forty-five types of assault long guns, including many
semi-automatic rifles. Id. at 775–76, 775 n.7 (citing CRIM. LAW § 4-301(b); PUB. SAFETY § 5101(r)(2)). The term “semi-automatic” refers to firearms that require the shooter to pull the
trigger for each round of ammunition she wishes to expel, as opposed to automatic firearms,
which continuously expel ammunition as long as the trigger is depressed. Kolbe v. Hogan, 813
F.3d at 168 n.1. Narrow exceptions to the assault weapon ban granted limited ownership rights to
groups such as law enforcement officers. Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 776 (citing CRIM.
LAW § 4-302(7)).
17. Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 776 (citing CRIM. LAW § 4-306(a)).
18. Id. (citing CRIM. LAW § 4-305(b)). Unlike the provisions prohibiting assault weapons,
however, the law did not prohibit the “mere possession” of large-capacity magazines or the
transportation of large-capacity magazines into Maryland from outside the state. See id. at 776 &
n.9 (citing CRIM. LAW § 4-305).
19. See, e.g., Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 774 n.3 (determining that individual, gunowning citizens faced a “credible threat” of prosecution under the Firearm Safety Act).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 774 & n.3.
22. Id. at 774 & n.1.
23. Id. The complete list of plaintiffs in this case is: Mr. Kolbe; Mr. Turner; Wink’s Sporting
Goods, Inc.; Atlantic Guns, Inc.; Associated Gun Clubs of Baltimore, Inc.; Maryland Shall Issue,
Inc.; Maryland State Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc.; National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc.;
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On September 26, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the
State in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
challenging the Firearm Safety Act’s constitutionality.24 The next day, the
plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order.25
Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that the Firearm Safety Act violated their
rights under the Second Amendment, violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment,26 and was void for vagueness.27 The district
court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order, and the
parties agreed that the court should proceed to consider the matter on the
merits as opposed to the request for preliminary injunction alone.28
Subsequently, the plaintiffs and the State filed cross motions for summary
judgment.29 On August 22, 2014, the district court held that the Firearm
Safety Act was constitutional and granted summary judgment in favor of
the State.30
In the first part of its decision, the district court addressed the
plaintiffs’ claim that the Second Amendment protected their right to keep
and bear the assault weapons and large-capacity magazines banned by the
Firearm Safety Act.31 The district court was “inclined to find” that assault
weapons and large-capacity magazines fall outside the scope of Second
Amendment protection because they were not considered weapons
“commonly possessed for lawful purposes,” including self-defense.32
Despite this inclination, the court abstained from resolving this issue and
assumed that the Firearm Safety Act burdened the plaintiffs’ Second
Amendment right.33 The court proceeded to the next step of its Second
Amendment analysis and determined that intermediate scrutiny should

and Maryland Licensed Firearms Dealers Association, Inc. Id. at 774. The State includes the
Governor, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Department of State Police and
Superintendent of the Maryland State Police, and the Maryland State Police. The plaintiffs sued
all the defendants in their official capacities. Id. at 774 n.2.
24. Id. at 776.
25. Id.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
27. Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 776–77.
28. Id. at 776.
29. Id. at 774–75.
30. Id. at 803.
31. Id. at 782.
32. Id. at 788. The court noted that assault weapons represent no more than three percent of
the current civilian gun stock, and ownership of those weapons is highly concentrated in less than
one percent of the U.S. population. Id. The court also highlighted the fact that assault weapons
are used at a disproportionate rate in mass shootings and murders of law enforcement officers as
compared to their ownership levels in the general public. Id.
33. Id. at 789. Other courts have assumed Second Amendment infringement in order to
reach the second step of the analysis. Id. (citing Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875–76
(4th Cir. 2013); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1260–61 (D.C. Cir.
2011)).
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apply to the Firearm Safety Act.34 The court noted that the act only affected
assault weapon ownership and did not affect ownership of a handgun or any
other type of weapon for the purpose of self-defense.35 Thus, the court
reasoned that the act did not unduly burden the core right under the Second
Amendment: self-defense within the home.36 Lastly, the district court held
that the Firearm Safety Act survived intermediate scrutiny because it
furthers Maryland’s dual interests of protecting public safety and reducing
crime.37
The plaintiffs also argued that the Firearm Safety Act violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by containing
exceptions allowing former law enforcement officers to possess the
weapons and magazines banned to others.38 The court denied the plaintiffs’
Equal Protection claim, holding that Maryland was not treating similarlysituated persons differently by allowing retired law enforcement officers to
own assault weapons and large-capacity magazines while denying that same
right to the general public.39
Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that two specific uses of the word “copy”
rendered the Firearm Safety Act void for vagueness because a reasonable
person could not discern what constitutes a “copy” of the banned assault
weapons.40 The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge,
holding that the word “copy” was not unconstitutionally vague.41 The

34. Id. at 790.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 792–97.
38. Id. at 797.
39. Id. at 799. The court emphasized retired law enforcement officers’ extensive training and
experiences ensuring public safety as evidence that they are not similar to the general public in all
relevant respects. Id. at 798–99.
40. Id. at 799. The Firearm Safety Act contains the word “copy” three times. MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-301(d)(3) (West Supp. 2015); PUB. SAFETY § 5-101(r)(2); CRIM. LAW § 4301(c).
41. Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 803. The court noted that the term “copies” had
been a part of Maryland firearms law for over twenty years, yet no arrest or conviction resulting
from a misunderstanding of the term occurred during that time period. Id. at 802. The court also
explained that the Maryland Attorney General and the Maryland State Police have issued opinions
on what constitutes a copy and offering to answer any further questions that citizens might have.
Id. at 801–02 (citing Regulated Firearms—Assault Weapons—Whether a Weapon is a “Copy” of
a Designated Assault Weapon and Therefore Subject to the Regulated Firearms Law, 95 Md. Op.
Att’y Gen. 101 (2010) (explaining that a copy of a designated assault weapon has similar
components and function to that weapon, not a mere cosmetic similarity); MARYLAND STATE
POLICE, FIREARMS BULLETIN #10-2, INFORMATION ON ASSAULT WEAPONS PURCHASES (2010),
http://mdsp.maryland.gov/Document%20Downloads/FIREARMS%20BULLETIN%2010-2.pdf
(providing information about what the Maryland State Police consider a copy of an enumerated
assault weapon)).
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plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.42
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
For over two centuries, the Constitution of the United States, through
the Second Amendment, has preserved the right to keep and bear arms.43
Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century and continuing into the
twenty-first century, courts almost universally recognized that the Second
Amendment protects the collective right of the militia to keep and bear arms
and does not protect an individual right.44 Yet, within the past decade, the
United States Supreme Court’s conception of the right to keep and bear
arms changed drastically when the Court held that the Second Amendment
confers an individual right to keep and bear arms and applies to the
individual states.45 Section II.A recites a brief history of the Second
Amendment and its historical understanding dating back to the founding of
the United States of America. Section II.B discusses how the holdings in
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago46 altered Second Amendment
jurisprudence by recognizing an individual right to keep and bear arms and
how courts examine contemporary firearms legislation in light of those
holdings. Finally, Section II.C examines the central issue that courts have
grappled with since Heller and McDonald—the correct standard of
scrutiny—and the growing trend among courts towards applying
intermediate scrutiny.

42. Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. App’x
880 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
44. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2002) (referring to the
collective rights view as the “dominant view of the Second Amendment . . . widely accepted by
the federal courts . . . .”); United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 403 (6th Cir. 2000) (“It is wellestablished that the Second Amendment does not create an individual right.”); Love v. Pepersack,
47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Since [1939], lower federal courts have uniformly held that the
Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than individual, right.”); Eckert v. City of
Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610, 610 (3d Cir. 1973) (“[T]he right to keep and bear arms is not a right
given by the United States Constitution.”); Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521, 526 (N.J. 1968) (“As the
language of the amendment itself indicates it was not framed with individual rights in mind. Thus
it refers to the collective right ‘of the people’ to keep and bear arms in connection with ‘a wellregulated militia.’”). There are many other cases reiterating this principle. But see United States
v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 221–27 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing an individual right to keep and
bear arms, although “mindful that almost all of our sister circuits have rejected any individual
rights view of the Second Amendment”).
45. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“There seems to us no
doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual
right to keep and bear arms.”); see also infra Part II.B (explaining the significance of the Heller
and McDonald decisions).
46. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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A. The Great Debate: The Struggle Between Viewing the Second
Amendment as an Individual Right or a Collective Right in the
Years Prior to Heller
The Second Amendment declares, “[a] well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”47 The first half of the Second
Amendment, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free state,” is the prefatory clause, which provides the law’s purpose.48 The
second half of the Amendment, from “the right of the people” onward, is
the operative clause, which gives a command.49 In the decades prior to
Heller, individual right theorists and collective right theorists clashed over
the relationship between these two clauses.50 Individual right theorists
believe the Second Amendment guarantees a personal right to keep and
bear arms; thus, the prefatory clause does not affect the operative clause.51
Collective right theorists believe the Second Amendment provides a right to
keep and bear arms “in connection with service in the state militia”; thus,
the prefatory clause modifies the operative clause and defines Second
Amendment rights.52
The debate between individual and collective right theorists predates
the Second Amendment’s ratification.53 Discussions at the Constitutional
Convention,54 among early colonial and state legislators,55 and in eighteenth
century legal commentary56 demonstrate that many citizens, including some
Founders, understood the Second Amendment as protecting only the
47. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
48. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577, 595.
49. Id. at 577 (referring to the relationship between the prefatory and operative clause and
stating that there must exist “a link between the stated purpose and the command”).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 674–75, 675 n.2 (4th Cir. 2010)
(discussing the debate between individual and collective right theorists).
51. Id. at 675 n.2 (citing Kenneth A. Klukowski, Armed by Right: The Emerging
Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 167, 180–81 (2008)).
52. Id. at 674–75. Because the Justices conducted thorough historical research, much of this
discussion of early understandings of the Second Amendment is informed by the opinions in
Heller and McDonald. This reflects both the importance of those opinions and the lack of Second
Amendment decisions for approximately seventy years prior to Heller. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S.
at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority “disregard[s] a unanimous opinion of
this Court, upon which substantial reliance has been placed by legislators and citizens for nearly
70 years.”).
53. Compare McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 768 (2010) (determining that the
right to keep and bear arms for the personal goal of self-defense was “fundamental” to those who
drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights), with United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)
(asserting that the purpose of the Second Amendment was to support the militia established by the
Constitution).
54. Miller, 307 U.S. at 179.
55. Id. at 179–81 (providing examples of legislation from Massachusetts, New York,
Virginia instituting gun laws for military purposes).
56. Id. at 179.
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collective right to bear arms for service in the militia.57 A number of state
ratification conventions, for example, proposed different versions of the
Second Amendment that emphasized the importance of protecting military
interests, not individual interests.58 Nevertheless, other sources of legal
commentary59 and deliberations prior to the ratification of the Bill of
Rights60 assumed that the right to keep and bear arms was individual and
fundamental.61
State constitutions, enacted before or immediately
following ratification, commonly included a right of citizens to bear arms in
defense of themselves and the state, protecting both an individual and
collective right.62
In the period between the ratification of the Second Amendment and
the Civil War, courts and prominent legal scholars continued to espouse a
variety of views on whether the amendment protected an individual or
collective right to bear arms.63 In Houston v. Moore,64 Justice Story
discussed the power of states to organize and arm the militia, but suggested
that the Second Amendment “may not . . . have any important bearing on
this point.”65 In Johnson v. Tompkins,66 Justice Baldwin posited that a
citizen “had a right to carry arms in defence of his property or person.”67
Justice Story and Justice Baldwin’s assertions are two post-ratification
examples of an individual rights understanding of the Second
Amendment.68 Several state courts69 and legal commentators70 also adopted
57. Id.
58. Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570, 655 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But
see id. at 603 (majority opinion) (“That concern found expression, however, not in the various
Second Amendment precursors proposed in the state conventions, but in separate structural
provisions that would have given the States concurrent and seemingly non-pre-emptible authority
to organize, discipline, and arm the militia when the Federal Government failed to do so.”).
59. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 768 (2010) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at
594).
60. Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 598).
61. Id. at 769.
62. Heller, 554 U.S. at 600–02.
63. See infra notes 64–71 and accompanying text (providing cases and commentary
supporting the individual rights view). But see infra notes 72–73 (providing cases and
commentary demonstrating the collective rights view).
64. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
65. Heller, 554 U.S. at 610 (quoting Houston, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 52–53 (Story, J.,
dissenting)). The quoted passage from Justice Story actually refers to the Fifth Amendment, but it
can be safely assumed that reference was a typographical error because Justice Story quotes the
entire substance of the Second Amendment in the same sentence. See id. (“The fifth amendment
to the constitution, declaring that ‘a well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,’ may not, perhaps, be
thought to have any important bearing on this point.”).
66. 13 F. Cas. 840 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7416).
67. Id. at 852.
68. Heller, 554 U.S. at 610–11.
69. E.g., Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490
(1850); Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356, 360 (1833).
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the individual rights view, often by declaring that the right to keep and bear
arms was calculated to allow for self-defense, the traditional point of
emphasis for individual right supporters.71 Conversely, collective right
theorists point to other state court decisions from the post-ratification period
that emphasize the right to bear arms in connection with military service.72
Collective right theorists acknowledge Justice Story’s opinion in Moore,
but claim that his commentary on the Constitution more accurately portrays
his view that a well-regulated militia is “the natural defence of a free
country against sudden foreign invasions, domestic insurrections, and
domestic usurpations of power by rulers.”73
The debate between individual rights theorists and collective rights
theorists arose again after the Civil War.74 Notably, the 39th Congress’
decision to disband Southern militias, but not to disarm their members, was
seen as an individual rights endorsement.75 Furthermore, the courts during
this time period recognized that the Second Amendment limited the power
of the federal government, not the power of the states.76
In 1939, the Supreme Court appeared to adopt a collective right view.
In United States v. Miller,77 the Court upheld the application of the National
Firearms Act78 to short-barrel shotguns shipped in interstate commerce.79
Namely, the Court determined that the Second Amendment was created
with “obvious purpose” to assure the continuation and effectiveness of the
militia.80 The Second Amendment did not secure the right to possess shortbarrel shotguns because the shotguns were not part of “ordinary military
equipment” and could not “contribute to the common defense.”81 After
Miller, and until Heller almost seventy years later, the Supreme Court did
not recognize any non-militia-related interests under the Second

70. Heller, 554 U.S. at 605–10 (discussing nineteenth century scholars Rawle, Story and
Blackstone, who endorsed the individual right view of the Second Amendment).
71. See id. at 599 (adopting the individual right view and expressing that self-defense is the
“central component” of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms).
72. E.g., Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840).
73. Heller, 554 U.S. at 667–68 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1897, at 620–21 (4th ed. 1873)
(footnote omitted)).
74. Id. at 614 (majority opinion).
75. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 772–73 (2010).
76. Heller, 554 U.S. at 674–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see generally McDonald, 561 U.S. at
754 (2010) (explaining that the Bill of Rights originally only applied against the federal
government).
77. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
78. I.R.C. §§ 5801–5872 (West 2016) (original version at Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236
(1934)).
79. Miller, 307 U.S. at 177, 183.
80. Id. at 178.
81. Id.
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Amendment.82 Lower courts, following what was perceived as a wellsettled rule, consistently held that the Second Amendment protected a
collective right, rather than an individual right to keep and bear arms.83
B. Come Heller High Water: The Supreme Court Settles the Debate
and Provides the Analytical Framework for Lower Courts
Two landmark cases, decided two years and two days apart,
dramatically changed the interpretation and application of the Second
Amendment.84 In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court
announced that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to
keep and bear arms.85 The Court also established a new test for evaluating
Second Amendment challenges, whereby courts must consider first whether
the challenged law burdens an individual’s right to possess and use firearms
for traditionally lawful purposes and, if the law does burden an individual’s
right, the court must subsequently analyze that law under an appropriate
standard of heightened scrutiny.86 In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the
Supreme Court incorporated the Second Amendment through the
Fourteenth Amendment, requiring that states recognize an individual’s right
to keep and bear arms.87
The respondent in Heller, Dick Heller, carried a handgun while on
duty as a District of Columbia special police officer.88 Mr. Heller applied
for a registration certificate in order to keep a handgun at his home, but the
District of Columbia denied his application.89 The respondent and five
other D.C. residents filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia seeking to enjoin the city from enforcing three of its laws
restricting private handgun ownership and use.90 The challenged District of
Columbia laws banned handgun registration, required firearms in the home
82. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 900 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also supra note 44.
83. See supra note 44.
84. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 253–54 (2d Cir. 2015)
(referring to Heller as “the seminal decision” and McDonald as “a landmark case”); United States
v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011) (describing Heller and McDonald as “landmark
decisions”).
85. 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
86. Id. at 626–29; see also N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 254 (“This two-step
rubric flows from the dictates of Heller and McDonald . . . .”).
87. 561 U.S. at 750 (majority opinion). A majority of the Court held that the Second
Amendment was incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, but the majority splintered on
exactly which section permitted incorporation, producing a plurality opinion on this specific issue.
See id. at 748–49 (revealing the split with respect to various sections of the opinion); id. at 805–06
(Thomas, J., concurring) (urging the Court to incorporate the Second Amendment through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause).
88. Heller, 554 U.S. at 575.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 575–76; see infra note 91 (providing the three laws in question).
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to remain inoperable, and imposed a licensing requirement for carrying a
handgun.91 The district court dismissed the complaint, and the respondent
appealed.92 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the district court’s ruling on Second Amendment grounds and
directed the district court to enter summary judgment for the respondent.93
The District of Columbia appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.94
First, the Supreme Court analyzed the language and history of the
Second Amendment.95 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, examined
the meaning of the prefatory and operative clauses at the time of the Second
Amendment’s enactment.96 The Court also discussed the way early colonial
legislation, state constitutions, case law, and commentaries viewed the right
to keep and bear arms.97 Ultimately, the Court championed the individual
right view and stated that the Second Amendment “elevates above all other
interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in
defense of hearth and home.”98 Despite recognizing an individual right, the
Court carefully circumscribed it. Justice Scalia provided an informative,
not exhaustive, list of statutes that impede the right to keep and bear arms
but remain presumptively lawful.99 Additionally, the Court identified two
constraints, first recognized in Miller, on the types of weapons protected
under the Second Amendment.100 Weapons must be “typically possessed
by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes” and “in common use at the
time.”101 The Court explained that the “in common use at the time”
limitation, which first appeared in Miller, was fairly supported by the
custom of denying “dangerous and unusual weapons” protection under the
Second Amendment.102
91. See generally D.C. CODE §§ 7-2.501(12), 7-2502.01(a) (2001); D.C. CODE §§ 72502.02(a)(4), 7-2507.02 (2001), invalidated by Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
92. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 576–600 (defining and examining the prefatory and operative clauses of the Second
Amendment).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 600–26; see also supra notes 53–76.
98. Id. at 635; see also id. at 628 (noting that “the inherent right of self-defense has been
central to the Second Amendment right”).
99. Id. at 626–27, 627 n.26. He stated:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools or government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
Id. at 626–27 (footnote omitted).
100. Id. at 624–25.
101. Id. (first citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); then quoting id. at 179)).
102. Id. at 627.
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Finally, the Supreme Court examined the three District of Columbia
laws.103 The Court held that two of the laws failed under both standards of
scrutiny applicable to fundamental rights, but notably declined to
recommend a specific level of scrutiny for the Second Amendment analysis,
despite Justice Breyer’s admonition in his dissent.104 The Court, however,
disqualified rational basis review and sharply criticized Breyer’s proposal,
the interest-balancing approach.105 The Court did not address the
constitutionality of the District’s third law, the licensing requirement, and
assumed that the requirement would not interfere with the respondent’s
requested relief.106
Two years after deciding Heller, the Supreme Court expanded Heller’s
reach in the landmark decision of McDonald v. Chicago. In McDonald,
Otis McDonald and three other Chicago residents wanted to keep handguns
in their homes for the purpose of self-defense.107 Mr. McDonald, a
community activist, received threats because of his efforts to introduce
alternative policing strategies in his community.108 Likewise, the other
petitioners were subjected to threats and violence.109 One Chicago
ordinance required residents to obtain a registration certificate in order to
possess a firearm, but another ordinance prohibited the registration of most
handguns.110 Oak Park, a town in the Chicago suburbs, had a similar
ordinance that entirely prohibited all firearms.111
The McDonald Court held that the Second Amendment is applicable
against the states and, therefore, remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to
103. Id. at 628–31.
104. Id. at 628–31, 634; id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that the standard
“matters” for future Second Amendment cases); see also infra notes 123–129 and accompanying
text discussing standards of scrutiny.
105. Id. at 628 n.27 (majority opinion) (explaining that rational basis scrutiny “could not be
used” to evaluate legislation that attempts to burden a specific, enumerated right); id. at 634–35
(“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected
to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”). Justice Breyer acknowledged that the writers of
the Second Amendment sought to protect the right of citizens to possess and use arms in selfdefense. Id. at 682 (Breyer, J., dissenting). However, Justice Breyer also identified several
interests a legislature might have in limiting citizen access to firearms: saving lives, preventing
injury, and reducing crime. Id. Recognition of these competing interests colored Justice Breyer’s
interest-balancing approach, which was intended to find the middle ground between rational basis
review, which presumes a gun regulation’s constitutionality, and strict scrutiny, which presumes a
gun regulation’s unconstitutionality. Id. at 689. This approach is designed to mirror inquiries the
Court conducted in other contexts, such as election law cases, and defer to the legislature in
instances where lawmakers are likely to have greater expertise and fact-finding ability. Id. at 690.
106. Id. at 630–31.
107. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
108. Id. at 751.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 750 (quoting CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 8-20-040(a), 8-20-050(c) (2009);
OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE § 27-1-1 (2009)).
111. Id. (quoting OAK PARK, ILL. VILLAGE CODE § 27-2-1 (2007)).
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determine if the relevant city ordinances impeding and prohibiting handgun
possession violated the Second Amendment.112 The Court reiterated that
the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is the “central component”
of the Second Amendment and found that right to be “necessary to our
system of ordered liberty.”113 Thus, the Court’s incorporation doctrine
counseled that the right to keep and bear arms was fully applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.114 After incorporating the
Second Amendment, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s judgment and
remanded to allow the court of appeals to consider whether the pertinent
laws unconstitutionally restricted the right to keep and bear arms.115
The Court declared in Heller and McDonald that the Second
Amendment protects a private, individual right to possess and use firearms
for traditionally lawful purposes, especially self-defense within the home.116
The test Heller sets forth is, first, a court must consider whether the
challenged law burdens an individual’s Second Amendment rights by
prohibiting conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment
through two inquiries.117 This inquiry often requires a court to consider the
list of presumptively lawful statutes provided in Heller.118 If the regulation
prohibits a specific type of weapon, a court must consider whether lawabiding citizens typically possess that weapon for lawful purposes and
whether the weapon is “in common use at the time.”119 Second, if a court
112. Id. at 791. Justice Alito, writing for the majority on this issue, explored the history of the
Bill of Rights with respect to incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 753–59.
The Court traced the path from Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), a landmark case that
rejected the Bill of Rights’ applicability to the states, to the modern doctrine of selective
incorporation, which has incorporated almost all of the provisions in the Bill of Rights to the
states. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 754; id. at 763 (explaining that selective incorporation uses the
Due Process Clause to incorporate “particular rights contained within the first eight
Amendments”). Since Heller implicated federal law and no Supreme Court opinion to date had
addressed incorporation of the Second Amendment, some lower courts had concluded that the
Second Amendment did not apply to the states. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 752 (citing NRA, Inc. v.
Oak Park, 617 F. Supp. 2d 752, 754 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (noting that the district court refused to apply
the Second Amendment against the states because Heller “did not opine” on the subject of
incorporation)).
113. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599
(2008)); id. at 778.
114. Id. at 750. Justice Thomas wrote separately to argue that the Second Amendment should
be incorporated through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather
than the Due Process Clause. Id. at 800 (Thomas, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 791.
116. E.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the
decisions in Heller and McDonald established a “clearly-defined fundamental right” to have
firearms in the home for the purpose of self-defense).
117. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 252–53 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“Guided by the teachings of the Supreme Court, our own jurisprudence, and the examples
provided by our sister circuits, we adopt a two-step analytical framework . . . .”).
118. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
119. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n., 804 F.3d at 255.
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determines that the law in question indeed burdens an individual’s Second
Amendment rights through either of these tests, it must apply heightened
scrutiny to the law in question.120
Arguably, the tandem of Heller and McDonald transformed the right
to keep and bear arms more profoundly than any other event since the
enactment of the Second Amendment. Heller declared that the Second
Amendment protected an individual right to keep and bear arms, and
McDonald secured that right for the citizens of the various states.121
Furthermore, Heller and McDonald dramatically altered the approach that
lower courts use for legislation challenged under the Second
Amendment.122
C. Under Scrutiny: The Standards of Scrutiny After Heller and
McDonald and the Growing Preference for Intermediate Scrutiny
When considering cases concerning alleged violations of constitutional
rights, the Supreme Court employs different standards of judicial review
known as levels or standards of scrutiny.123 Strict scrutiny, the most
exacting of the Court’s standards, is applied to laws that limit the exercise
of a fundamental right.124 In order to overcome strict scrutiny, a statute
must promote a compelling governmental interest, and the government
must narrowly tailor the statute in question in order to achieve that
interest.125 Rational basis review, the most deferential of the Court’s
standards, is used for legislation that does not significantly interfere with a
fundamental right.126 Under rational basis scrutiny, a statute rationally in
furtherance of a legitimate governmental purpose is constitutional.127
Finally, the Court utilizes a third level of scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, for
120. Id. at 254.
121. See supra notes 98, 112 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 116–120 and accompanying text.
123. Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (referring to the “standards
of scrutiny” the Court applies). The levels of scrutiny are also, of course, applied in the context of
an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but this Note discusses their application to an alleged violation of one of the rights
expressed in the Bill of Rights.
124. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983); United
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments . . . .” (citing
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1931); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452
(1938)).
125. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to a statute using racial classifications).
126. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long
as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”).
127. Id.
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laws that either implicate important, non-fundamental interests or do not
impose a severe burden on a fundamental right.128 A statute will survive
intermediate scrutiny if it is substantially related to the achievement of an
important governmental objective.129
In Heller, the Supreme Court eliminated rational basis review as a
viable standard of scrutiny for alleged violations of the Second
Amendment, but the Court did not provide, and has not provided since, any
further guidance in regard to the proper standard.130 Therefore, courts have
applied a range of standards of scrutiny to laws challenged under the
Second Amendment.131 The following Sections explain these different
kinds of scrutiny as they have been applied in the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals and other Circuits, respectively.
1. The Fourth Circuit’s First Amendment Framework Leads to the
Application of Intermediate Scrutiny
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals provided a blueprint for lower
courts to use when analyzing post-Heller Second Amendment challenges in
United States v. Chester.132 In Chester, the challenged law prevented
domestic violence misdemeanants from obtaining firearms.133 Applying the
first step from the Heller analysis, the court concluded that the defendant’s
Second Amendment rights remained intact following his domestic violence
conviction.134
The court noted that laws disarming felons were
presumptively valid under Heller, but determined that there was “a lack of
historical evidence” concerning disarming misdemeanants.135 The court
then turned to the level of scrutiny applicable to a law that burdens conduct
protected under the Second Amendment.136 During this part of its analysis,
the Fourth Circuit explained that the First Amendment could serve as a

128. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
562–63 (1980) (establishing that, although the First Amendment protects commercial speech,
there is a “‘commonsense’ distinction” between commercial speech and private speech, which is
at the core of the First Amendment right to free speech (quoting Ohralik v. Oh. State Bar Ass’n,
436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).
129. Id. at 566.
130. See, e.g., Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 447 (2015) (“So far, however, the Justices have declined to specify how much
substantive review the Second Amendment requires.”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638,
642 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (referring to the decision of which level of scrutiny to apply as a
“quagmire”).
131. See infra Parts II.C.1–2.
132. 628 F.3d 673, 678 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[We] . . . reissue our decision to provide district
courts in this Circuit guidance on the framework for deciding Second Amendment challenges.”).
133. Id.; see generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(9) (West 2016).
134. Chester, 628 F.3d at 681–82.
135. Id. at 681.
136. Id. at 682.
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“guide” since Heller had neglected to provide a specific standard of
scrutiny.137 In cases that assert a violation of the right to free speech as
protected under the First Amendment, the court looks at two factors to
determine the applicable standard of scrutiny: the nature of the conduct
being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law burdens the
right.138 Private speech subject to content-specific regulations would be
examined under strict scrutiny, but commercial speech or speech subject to
content-neutral regulations would be afforded greater deference by the
court.139 In Chester, the Fourth Circuit held that intermediate scrutiny was
appropriate because the defendant was not a “law-abiding, responsible”
citizen seeking to exercise his rights under the Second Amendment, so the
burden of the law was light.140
One year later, in United States v. Masciandaro,141 the Fourth Circuit
addressed a Second Amendment challenge to a federal statute that
prohibited possessing a handgun in a national park.142 The defendant in
Masciandaro was asleep in his car within the national park area when he
was arrested for having a gun in his vehicle.143 Because the defendant
frequently slept in his car while traveling for business, he argued that Heller
gave him a right to possess a handgun for the purpose of self-defense.144
The Fourth Circuit applied its First Amendment framework once again,
holding that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate with respect to laws that
burden the right to keep and bear arms outside of the home.145 The court,
relying on Heller, concluded that “firearm rights have always been more
limited” outside of the home and upheld the statute as constitutional.146
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. Content-neutral regulations serve purposes unrelated to the content of the speech.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). When the government acts pursuant to
a purpose independent of the content of the regulated speech, it lessens the probability that the
government enacted the regulation out of disapproval with the message of the speech, the
principal inquiry in determining content neutrality. Id. On the other hand, the message of the
speech itself is the only justification for content-specific regulations. See id. (implying that
content-specific regulations lack independent justification because “[a] regulation that serves
purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral . . . .”). Based on this
distinction, courts have applied different levels of scrutiny to the two types of regulations.
Chester, 628 F.3d at 682; see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (holding that a
town’s sign code was a content-based regulation that was subject to strict scrutiny).
140. Chester, 628 F.3d at 682–83. The court vacated and remanded to afford the government
a chance to establish a relationship between the federal statute and an important governmental
goal. Id. at 683. On remand, the district court applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld the
defendant’s conviction. United States v. Chester, 847 F. Supp. 2d 902, 911–12 (S.D.W.V. 2012).
141. 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).
142. Id. at 465.
143. Id. at 460.
144. Id. at 465.
145. Id. at 470–71.
146. Id. at 470, 474.
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In Woollard v. Gallagher,147 a handgun owner and a Second
Amendment advocacy group challenged a Maryland law requiring its
citizens to present a good and substantial reason for obtaining a handgun
permit.148 In Woollard, the Fourth Circuit did not refer to its First
Amendment-like approach during the Second Amendment analysis.149
Citing Masciandaro, the court directly applied intermediate scrutiny to the
challenged law because it implicated the right to keep and bear arms outside
of the home and upheld the statute.150
Case law within the Fourth Circuit suggests that a First Amendment
approach is a useful analogy for analyzing Second Amendment claims.151
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit’s precedent indicates a tendency to apply
intermediate scrutiny to firearms legislation.152
2. Other Circuits’ Approaches and the Affinity for Intermediate
Scrutiny
Many state and federal courts outside of the Fourth Circuit have also
addressed firearms legislation in the wake of Heller and McDonald.
Several circuit courts of appeals have adopted a First Amendment-like
approach, resembling the approach used by the Fourth Circuit, or crafted
their own approaches.153 The most common level of scrutiny currently
applied by courts is intermediate scrutiny.154
Immediately following Heller and McDonald, courts applied different
levels of scrutiny to firearms legislation. In United States v. Engstrum,155
for example, the District Court for the District of Utah held that a federal
statute preventing domestic violence misdemeanants from owning a
firearm, the same law challenged in Chester, should be analyzed under
strict scrutiny.156 After applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded that the
federal law was narrowly tailored to its legislative objective and, therefore,

147. 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013).
148. Id. at 870.
149. Id. (referring only to the decision in Masciandaro and not mentioning the First
Amendment framework)
150. Id. at 868, 876.
151. See supra notes 137–139, 149–150 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Masciandaro,
638 F.3d at 470 (“[A]s has been the experience under the First Amendment, we might expect that
courts will employ different types of scrutiny in assessing burdens on Second Amendment
rights . . . .”).
152. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876 (applying intermediate scrutiny); Masciandaro, 638 F.3d
at 471 (applying intermediate scrutiny); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682–83 (4th Cir.
2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny).
153. See infra notes 168–168, 175–178 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 169–174 and accompanying text.
155. 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2009).
156. Id. at 1231–32; see supra note 133.
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was presumptively lawful.157 In GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia,158 the
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia applied intermediate
scrutiny to a Georgia law restricting the possession of weapons in a place of
worship and upheld the challenged law.159 The court cited a portion of
Justice Breyer’s Heller dissent arguing that the inclusion of a list of
presumptively lawful regulations is inconsistent with strict scrutiny.160 The
court ultimately applied intermediate scrutiny because Georgia’s law
concerned firearm possession outside the home.161 Still, other courts
eschewed the traditional levels of scrutiny for standards such as an “undue
burden” test.162
Several circuit courts of appeals have adopted a First Amendment-like
approach, akin to the approach used by the Fourth Circuit. In United States
v. Marzzarella,163 the Third Circuit held that a federal law prohibiting
ownership of a gun with an obliterated serial number did not violate the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.164 The court, after
describing the procedure it used for assessing the standard of scrutiny to
apply to First Amendment claims, announced, “[w]e see no reason why the
Second Amendment would be any different.”165 The Court applied
intermediate scrutiny because citizens could continue to own any lawful
firearm if that firearm bore its original serial number.166 The Seventh
Circuit, in Ezell v. City of Chicago,167 also borrowed from its First
Amendment case law to determine the standard of judicial scrutiny
applicable to Chicago’s ordinance restricting citizens’ use of firing
ranges.168
Today, most courts confronting firearms legislation apply intermediate
scrutiny.169 In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo,170 the Second

157. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.
158. 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Ga. 2011).
159. Id. at 1317–19.
160. Id. at 1317 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
161. Id. at 1317.
162. See, e.g., People v. Flores, 169 Cal. App. 4th 568, 577 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(upholding a law preventing the carrying of loaded firearms in public places under a “midlevel
standard of scrutiny analogous to the ‘undue burden’ standard”).
163. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
164. Id. at 87.
165. Id. at 96–97.
166. Id. at 98–99.
167. 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
168. Id. at 702–03, 706–07.
169. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 260–61 (2d Cir.
2015). In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, the court stated:
[W]e conclude that intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny is appropriate. This
conclusion coheres not only with that reached by the D.C. Circuit when considering
substantially similar gun-control laws, but also with the analyses undertaken by other
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Circuit Court of Appeals confronted gun-control legislation passed by the
New York and Connecticut legislatures following the Newtown tragedy that
closely resembled Maryland’s Firearm Safety Act of 2013.171 The court
held that the laws’ assault weapon and large-capacity magazine bans did not
violate the Second Amendment and noted during its level of scrutiny
inquiry that “many” other courts conducting analyses of laws implicating
the Second Amendment have applied intermediate scrutiny.172 The court
cites to Marzzarella, Chester, and other recently issued opinions from the
Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits where intermediate scrutiny was applied to
laws burdening the right to keep and bear arms.173 In addition, the District
of Columbia Circuit court has applied intermediate scrutiny to similar
legislation.174
Despite intermediate scrutiny’s prevalence, in Friedman v. City of
Highland Park,175 the Seventh Circuit abandoned the more traditional tiers
of scrutiny analysis and applied a unique standard to a city ordinance
banning assault weapons and large-capacity magazines.176 The court
considered “whether a regulation bans weapons that were common at the
time of ratification or those that have ‘some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia’ and whether lawabiding citizens retain adequate means of self-defense.”177 The Seventh
Circuit upheld the ordinance, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.178

courts, many of which have applied intermediate scrutiny to laws implicating the
Second Amendment.
Id.; see also Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Consistent with the
reasoning of our sister circuit, we also agree that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate [for a law
burdening the right to keep and bear arms].”); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th
Cir. 2013) (“[L]ike the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, we apply intermediate scrutiny to [a
firearm statute] and hold that it is constitutional . . . .”); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo,
990 F. Supp. 2d 349, 366 (W.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 804 F.3d
242 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[C]ourts throughout the country have nearly universally applied some form
of intermediate scrutiny in the Second Amendment context.”); United States v. Lahey, 967 F.
Supp. 2d 731, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The emerging consensus appears to be that intermediate
scrutiny is generally the appropriate level of scrutiny for laws which substantially burden Second
Amendment rights.”).
170. 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015).
171. Id. at 247.
172. Id. at 260–61.
173. Id. at 261 n.101.
174. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
175. 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015).
176. Id. at 410; see also Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 182 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc
granted, 636 F. App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem) (“[T]hat court conjured its own test . . . .”).
177. Friedman, 784 F.3d at 410 (citation omitted) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 622 (2008)).
178. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015), denying cert. to 784 F.3d 406
(7th Cir. 2015).
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The judicial landscape outside of the Fourth Circuit supports the
application of intermediate scrutiny to firearms legislation, even when such
legislation burdens the right to possess certain weapons within the home for
self-defense.179 In addition, no post-Heller circuit court of appeals decision
has applied strict scrutiny to a comprehensive firearm ban, although other
circuits that apply a First Amendment framework have considered the
possibility.180
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Kolbe v. Hogan, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
district court’s decision to uphold the Firearm Safety Act, holding that a
complete prohibition of semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity magazines
encroaches on the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms and that
a standard of strict constitutional scrutiny should apply to such a
prohibition.181 First, the court reasoned that the Firearm Safety Act burdens
conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment because the assault
weapon and large-capacity magazine bans include firearms that are
typically used for lawful purposes and in common use.182 Second, it held
that the district court should have applied strict scrutiny because the
Firearm Safety Act significantly burdens the core right protected under the
Second Amendment: use of firearms for self-defense in the home.183
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case and instructed the
district court to evaluate the disputed sections of the Firearm Safety Act
under the standard of strict scrutiny.184 Additionally, the court affirmed the
district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the State on the
plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and vagueness claims.185
The Fourth Circuit began with a familiar first step in the wake of
Heller: assessing whether or not the Firearm Safety Act burdens conduct
protected by the Second Amendment.186 Because the Firearm Safety Act
specifically regulates weapons, Chief Judge Traxler, writing for the
majority, considered the appropriate test for determining if possession of a
weapon constitutes constitutionally protected conduct.187 Relying on
179. See supra notes 169–174 and accompanying text.
180. Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d at 196 (King, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96–97 (weighing whether to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny).
181. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 168 (majority opinion).
182. Id. at 178.
183. Id. at 181–82.
184. Id. at 192.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 172 (citing United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010)).
187. Id. at 173 (“[W]hen the regulated conduct relates to a particular class of weapons, we
must address an additional issue before we can say with assurance that the Second Amendment
applies . . . .”).
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Heller, the court stated that the Second Amendment only protects the right
to keep and bear weapons “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for
lawful purposes.”188 The court referred to evidence in the record showing
that more than eight million AR- or AK-style semi-automatic rifles were
manufactured in or imported into the United States between 1990–2012.189
In 2012 alone, the number of these weapons manufactured in or sold into
the United States was twice the number of Ford F-150 trucks sold in the
same year.190 The court also cited evidence that more than 75 million largecapacity magazines are in circulation in the United States.191 Based on this
evidence and other facts in the record, the court found that semi-automatic
rifles and large-capacity magazines were both commonly possessed by lawabiding citizens of the United States.192 The court noted that semiautomatic rifles and large-capacity magazines were possessed for lawful
purposes and criticized the State’s argument that semi-automatic rifles and
large-capacity magazines had to be actually used for lawful purposes to
warrant Second Amendment protection.193 Finally, the court asserted that
semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity magazines were not excluded from
Second Amendment protection under the “dangerous and unusual”
exception.194 The court applied the reasoning from Heller and explicitly
rejected the State’s argument that “unusually dangerous” was synonymous
with “dangerous and unusual.”195 In sum, the court found that semiautomatic rifles and large-capacity magazines fall within the confines of
Second Amendment protection.196
The Fourth Circuit next considered which level of scrutiny to apply,
the second step in the Heller framework.197 The court used the First
Amendment approach from United States v. Chester.198 Under this
approach, a court must consider “the nature of the conduct being regulated”
and “the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right.”199 The
Fourth Circuit explained that the Firearm Safety Act prevents citizens from
possessing banned weapons for all purposes, including the purpose of self-

188. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008)).
189. Id. at 174.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 176.
194. See id. at 177–78, 178 n.8; see infra Part IV.A (exploring the majority’s understanding of
the “dangerous and unusual” language).
195. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 177–78; see infra Part IV.A (providing a more in-depth discussion of
this point).
196. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 178.
197. Id. at 179.
198. 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010).
199. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 179 (quoting Chester, 628 F.3d at 682).
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defense in the home.200 The court noted that this right is fundamental, so
the conduct being regulated extends to the “core” of the Second
Amendment.201 The court rejected the argument that the availability of
other classes of firearms for self-defense within the home permits
prohibiting certain classes of weapons.202 The court also pointed out that
the Firearm Safety Act is a complete ban, so it significantly burdens this
fundamental right.203 Based on the nature of the conduct prohibited and the
burden imposed, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the law must be examined
under strict scrutiny.204 In so concluding, the court rejected other standards,
such as the Seventh Circuit’s Friedman test and intermediate scrutiny,
applied by courts to similar assault weapon and large-capacity magazine
bans.205 The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment
order on the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claims and remanded for the
district court to apply strict scrutiny.206
Next, the court addressed the plaintiffs’ claim that the Firearm Safety
Act’s exception, which allowed former law enforcement officers to possess
assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.207 Although the plaintiffs
argued that they were similarly situated to retired law enforcement officers
in all relevant respects, the Fourth Circuit highlighted several fundamental
differences between the two groups.208 Because an Equal Protection claim
200. Id. at 179–80.
201. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (explaining that the
interest-balancing approach is particularly inappropriate because the core of the constitutional
right under the Second Amendment is at stake)).
202. Id. at 180–81 (“[T]he fact that handguns, bolt-action and other manually-loaded long
guns, and, as noted earlier, a few semi-automatic rifles are still available for self-defense does not
mitigate this burden . . . .”); cf. id. at 181 (“[O]ne is not to have the exercise of liberty of
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place.” (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975))).
203. See Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 180 (“The burden imposed in this case is not merely
incidental. . . . [The Firearm Safety Act] reaches every instance where an AR-15 platform semiautomatic rifle or LCM might be preferable to handguns or bolt-action rifles . . . .”).
204. Id. at 181–82.
205. See id. at 182 (“We recognize that other courts have reached different outcomes when
assessing similar bans, but we ultimately find those decisions unconvincing.”).
206. Id. at 192.
207. Id. at 184–85. Judge Agee wrote this section of the majority opinion, with Judge King
concurring in the judgment and Chief Judge Traxler dissenting. See id. at 184, 199.
208. Id. at 185–88. These fundamental differences included the training and experience with
firearms that former police officers have, the public trust granted to police officers, and the threats
from criminals that former police officers face. Id. The court also determined that these
differences between retired law enforcement officers and private citizens were sufficiently related
to the objectives of the Firearm Safety Act. Id. at 188–89 (explaining that the retired law
enforcement officer exception is “directly related to [the Maryland legislature’s] broad objectives”
and the court “should not embrace” the argument made by Chief Judge Traxler’s dissent that the
differences between retired law enforcement officers and private citizens are not related to these
objectives).
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requires two groups that are similarly situated yet treated differently, the
court affirmed the district court’s ruling.209
Finally, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the plaintiffs’ claim that the
Firearm Safety Act is void for vagueness because the law uses the
undefined term “copies.”210 The court affirmed the district court and held
that the Firearm Safety Act is not void for vagueness because the act has a
plainly legitimate sweep that identifies a core of prohibited conduct such
that the ordinary citizen could understand it.211
Judge King concurred in the judgment on the plaintiffs’ equal
protection and vagueness claims, but strongly dissented from the majority’s
conclusion that the district court should have reviewed the Firearm Safety
Act under strict scrutiny.212 He argued that the Second Amendment should
not protect semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity magazines because
these firearms are “lethal weapons of war,” nearly indistinguishable from
some firearms singled out in Heller as “dangerous and unusual.”213 Judge
King disagreed with the majority’s conception of the “dangerous and
unusual” standard, specifically its reliance on the ambiguous word
“common”214 and its perfunctory treatment of the word “dangerous.”215
Although inclined to find that the Firearm Safety Act does not infringe on
Second Amendment rights, Judge King resisted doing so and proceeded to a
means-end scrutiny analysis.216 Judge King argued that the majority erred
by mandating that strict scrutiny apply to the Firearm Safety Act, because
intermediate scrutiny was counseled by the Fourth Circuit’s own
precedent,217 the decisions of sister circuits,218 and the degree to which the
209. Id. at 189–90.
210. Id. at 190; see generally MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-101(r)(2) (West Supp. 2015)
(classifying “a firearm that is any one of the following specific assault weapons or their copies” as
regulated firearms). Once again, Chief Judge Traxler wrote for the majority. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at
190.
211. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 192. In its analysis, the court explained that due process requires
criminal statutes to adequately inform citizens of ordinary intelligence about what type of conduct
is illegal, and if a criminal statute cannot be understood by the ordinary citizen, it should be held
void for vagueness. Id. at 190 (citing United States v. Sun, 278 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002)).
The court tempered this observation and stated that vagueness challenges are deferential and
unlikely to succeed if a statute has “a plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. at 190–91 (quoting United
States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 2010)).
212. Id. at 192 (King, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 193 (comparing an AR-15 semi-automatic rifle to a previously banned M-16 rifle).
214. Id. at 194 (“what line separates ‘common’ from ‘uncommon’ ownership” (quoting
Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 447
(2015))).
215. Id. at 195 (“Another significant problem with the panel majority’s conception of the
dangerous-and-unusual standard is that it renders the word ‘dangerous’ superfluous, on the
premise that all firearms are dangerous.”).
216. Id. at 196.
217. Id. at 197 (first citing Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); and then
citing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011)).
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law burdened the right to keep and bear arms.219 Therefore, Judge King
concluded that, were he the district judge, he would apply intermediate
scrutiny and uphold the Firearm Safety Act as constitutional.220
IV. ANALYSIS
In Kolbe v. Hogan, the Fourth Circuit held that the Second
Amendment protects semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity magazines
and that Maryland’s Firearm Safety Act should be subject to strict
scrutiny.221 The court made the correct judgment in this case, both because
it accurately construed Heller’s “dangerous and unusual” language, and
because it properly determined that Maryland’s comprehensive assault
weapon and large-capacity magazine ban should be subject to strict
scrutiny.222 The Fourth Circuit refuted several misconceptions concerning
the “dangerous and unusual” language in Heller, including the way the
language functions and its importance within the context of a judicial
analysis.223 Furthermore, the court sensibly concluded that the district court
should examine Maryland’s assault weapon and large-capacity magazine
bans under the strictest level of scrutiny.224 The Fourth Circuit advanced an
important argument in favor of applying strict scrutiny that other courts
must consider when faced with Second Amendment challenges to similar
legislation and may represent a shift in the tide of Second Amendment case
law.225 The Fourth Circuit’s decision may also persuade the Supreme Court
to address the circuit split regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny for
assault weapon bans.226 In addition, it requires state legislatures within the
circuit to pass more narrowly tailored firearms legislation.227
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Judgment Reaffirmed the Proper
Interpretation of “Dangerous and Unusual”
In Kolbe, the Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that semi-automatic
rifles and large-capacity magazines are typically possessed by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes and, therefore, are protected under the Second

218. Id. at 196 (“[N]ot a single court of appeals has ever—until now—deemed strict scrutiny
to be applicable to a firearms regulation along the lines of the [Firearm Safety Act].”).
219. See id. at 197 (holding that the Firearm Safety Act does not sufficiently inhibit the right
to keep and bear arms to warrant strict scrutiny).
220. See id. at 198.
221. Id. at 178, 182 (majority opinion).
222. See infra Part IV.A, Part IV.B.
223. See infra Part IV.A.
224. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 168.
225. See infra Part IV.B.
226. See infra Part IV.B.
227. See infra Part IV.B.
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Amendment.228 In doing so, the court clarified several misconceptions held
by the State, the dissent, and recent decisions from other courts concerning
Heller’s “dangerous and unusual” language.229 Kolbe emphasized that
“dangerous and unusual” is not synonymous with “unusually dangerous,”
the “dangerous and unusual” language is not an independent limitation on
the right to keep and bear arms, and the “in common use at the time”
language has not been supplanted by the “dangerous and unusual”
language.230
1. “Unusually Dangerous” is Not Synonymous with “Dangerous
and Unusual”
In Kolbe, the court faithfully adhered to the Supreme Court’s
“dangerous and unusual” language and rejected an alteration advanced by
the State and the dissent. In Heller, the “dangerous and unusual” language
first appears when the Court discusses the appropriate limits on the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.231 The Heller Court adopts a
limitation from United States v. Miller confining Second Amendment
protection to weapons “in common use at the time.”232 The Court explained
that this limitation is supported by the established practice of proscribing
the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.233 In Kolbe, the State
argued that “unusually dangerous” weapons fall outside the scope of
Second Amendment protection.234 Judge King, in his dissent, supported the
State’s use of the “unusually dangerous” benchmark by claiming that the
standard found support in Heller.235 The Fourth Circuit rightly refuted
these arguments. First, the court could not locate a single statute or case
mentioning the “unusually dangerous” standard, so it was unsupported by
legal precedent.236 Additionally, the State inappropriately rearranged
“dangerous and unusual,” two words that Heller Court purposefully
arranged conjunctively.237 Furthermore, substituting “unusually dangerous”
in place of “dangerous and unusual” would yield significant consequences
228. See Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 168 (announcing that semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity
magazines were within Second Amendment protection).
229. See, e.g., id. at 178 (concluding that the State’s unusually dangerous standard “is of no
avail”); see also infra Part IV.A.1–3 (explaining why other views of the “dangerous and unusual”
language are erroneous). But see Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 195 (King, J., dissenting) (“[T]he unusually
dangerous benchmark is no more difficult to apply than, for example, the majority’s dubious
test . . . .”).
230. See infra Parts IV.A–B
231. 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).
232. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)).
233. Id.
234. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 177 (majority opinion).
235. Id. at 195 (King, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 177 (majority opinion).
237. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
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that the Supreme Court did not intend.238 Whereas Heller’s arrangement
suggests that even a dangerous weapon may enjoy constitutional protection
if that weapon is in common use at the time, the State’s arrangement
forecloses this possibility entirely.239 It is also unclear which weapons are
so dangerous that they do not receive Second Amendment protection.240
Kolbe’s rejection of the “unusually dangerous” standard prevented the
manipulation of the “dangerous and unusual” language from Heller.
2.

“Dangerous and Unusual” Does Not Function as an
Independent Limitation on the Right to Keep and Bear Arms

The Kolbe court also correctly noted that the “dangerous and unusual”
language from Heller does not independently constrain the right to keep and
bear arms.241 In Kolbe, both the State and the dissent viewed “dangerous
and unusual” as an independent limitation on the right to keep and bear
arms.242 The State claimed that firearms that are “unusually dangerous” fall
altogether outside of the scope of the Second Amendment.243 Judge King
wrote in his dissent, “I am far from convinced that the Second Amendment
reaches the AR-15 and other assault weapons prohibited under Maryland
law, given their military-style features, particular dangerousness, and
questionable utility for self-defense.”244 Judge King later asserted that “the
Heller Court surely had relative dangerousness in mind when it repudiated
Second Amendment protection for short-barreled shotguns and ‘weapons
that are most useful in military service—M–16 rifles and the like.’”245
Thus, Judge King would presumptively rely on the AR-15’s dangerousness
as a factor in withdrawing Second Amendment protection from such a
weapon.246 Other courts have understood Heller’s dangerous and unusual
238. See id. at 177 (noting that Heller’s standard would sometimes protect dangerous weapons
that were “widely employed for lawful purposes”).
239. Id. at 177–78 (“But if the proper judicial standard is to go by total murders committed,
then handguns should be considered far more dangerous . . . . Yet Heller has established that
handguns are constitutionally protected . . . .”); see also, e.g., Friedman v. City of Highland Park,
784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015) (referring to statistics that reveal
handguns kill as many people in Chicago annually as mass shootings have killed nationwide in the
past decade).
240. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 177–78.
241. See id. at 177 (“The State’s novel ‘unusually dangerous’ standard reads too much into
Heller.”).
242. The State attempted to exclude the challenged weapons on the grounds that they were
dangerous and unusual. Id. Judge King repeatedly refers to the “dangerous-and-unusual”
standard in his analysis. Id. at 194–96 (King, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 177 (majority opinion).
244. Id. at 193 (King, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
245. Id. at 195 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008)).
246. See id. at 196 (stating that he is “strongly inclined” to declare that the Firearm Safety Act
does not implicate the Second Amendment). In his opinion, Judge King actually refrained from
reaching this conclusion in order to apply an appropriate level of scrutiny. Id.
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language in a similar light. In Commonwealth v. Caetano,247 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a Massachusetts law prohibiting
the possession of stun guns did not violate the Second Amendment.248 The
court used a dangerous and unusual test to analyze whether stun guns were
dangerous per se, which it defined as “designed and constructed to produce
death or great bodily harm . . . for the purpose of bodily assault or
defense,”249 and whether stun guns were unusual, which it defined as “a
weapon of warfare to be used by the militia.”250
As the majority stated in Kolbe, and as the Supreme Court confirmed
in vacating Commonwealth v. Caetano, the Court did not intend its phrase
“dangerous and unusual” to function as an independent limitation on an
individual Second Amendment right.251 Heller’s baseline protection under
the Second Amendment was an individual right, unconnected to military
service, to keep and bear arms in case of confrontation.252 The Supreme
Court articulated two limitations on what type of weapons command
Second Amendment protection: those which are “typically possessed by
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”253 and weapons “in common use
at the time.”254 The Heller Court went on to note that the “common use”
limitation “is fairly supported” by the practice of prohibiting “dangerous
and unusual weapons.”255 To infer the meaning the State does from this
language, the Supreme Court must have used the active tense.256 For
example, if the Heller Court had announced, “the common use limitation
fairly supports the tradition of banning dangerous and unusual weapons”
the phrasing would indicate that the “common use” analysis was a way of
answering a “dangerous and unusual” inquiry.257 This is not the case.258 As

247. 26 N.E.3d 688 (Mass. 2015), vacated per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016).
248. Id. at 695.
249. Id. at 692 (quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, 402 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 1980)).
250. Id. at 693.
251. See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (per curiam).
252. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008); see also Kolbe v. Hogan, 813
F.3d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem).
253. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 173 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 625). Heller offers the example of a
short-barreled shotgun as a weapon that fails this particular test. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 (citing
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)).
254. Id. at 172 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627).
255. 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (emphasis added).
256. Cf. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 178 (referring to Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Heller,
which focused on dangerousness alone, and indicating that Justice Breyer potentially construed
the “dangerous and unusual” and “common use” relationship in a different manner than the
majority in Heller intended).
257. See, e.g., id. (“Most likely, common use is the sole limiting principle.” (quoting Dan
Terzian, The Right to Bear (Robotic) Arms, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 755, 767–68 (2013))).
258. Other examples may prove instructive. Consider “the verdict is fairly supported by the
evidence” and “the writer’s conclusion is fairly supported by her arguments.” Both of these
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Kolbe emphasized, “it was only a dissent in Heller” that used this line of
reasoning.259 Typical possession by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes and common use at the time are the only constitutional hurdles a
particular weapon must clear in order to gain eligibility for Second
Amendment protection. Therefore, assertions like Judge King’s, that
dangerousness led the Heller Court to ban M-16 rifles, are misleading. The
Heller Court banned M-16 rifles because the rifles were not in common use
at the time, and by extension “unusual,” not because those weapons reached
a certain level of dangerousness.260 In Caetano v. Massachusetts, the
Supreme Court reinforced this view and criticized the Massachusetts court’s
understanding of the “dangerous and unusual” language.261 In his
concurrence, Justice Alito wrote, “If Heller tells us anything, it is that
firearms cannot be categorically prohibited just because they are
dangerous.”262
In summary, the court in Kolbe recognized that Heller used
“dangerous and unusual” to describe the types of weapons that might not
receive Second Amendment protection, but Heller did not intend
“dangerous and unusual” to independently constrain the right to keep and
bear arms.
3.

“In Common Use at the Time” Is Still Relevant to the
Consideration of a Second Amendment Claim

Lastly, Kolbe recognized that the “dangerous and unusual” language
has not supplanted the “in common use at the time” limitation from Heller.
The dissent and Friedman criticize the “in common use at the time”
limitation and its continued relevance. In Friedman, the Seventh Circuit
upheld a ban on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines while
dismissing interpretations of Heller that rely on the common use
limitation.263 The court wrote:
[R]elying on how common a weapon is at the time of litigation
would be circular to boot. Machine guns aren’t commonly owned
for lawful purposes today because they are illegal; semiautomatic weapons with large-capacity magazines are owned
more commonly because, until recently (in some jurisdictions),

sentences involve similar relationships and should illustrate the importance of the tense the Heller
Court used.
259. Id. at 178.
260. Id. at 177.
261. 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027 (2016) (per curiam).
262. Id. at 1028 (Alito, J., concurring). But see id. at 1131 (suggesting that “dangerous and
unusual” is a conjunctive test).
263. Friedman v. Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
447 (2015).
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they have been legal. Yet it would be absurd to say that the
reason why a particular weapon can be banned is that there is a
statute banning it, so that it isn’t commonly owned. A law’s
existence can’t be the source of its own constitutional validity.264
The dissent in Kolbe quoted this passage as support for the idea that
the majority misunderstood the word “unusual” as it functions within
Heller’s “dangerous and unusual” standard.265 While the majority defined
unusual in terms of whether a weapon is in common use or typically
possessed by the citizenry, the dissent contends that unusual cannot mean
not commonly possessed, because this would result in imaginary linedrawing, whereby a weapon’s popularity determines its constitutionality.266
Although this language may seem circular or absurd to some, the
majority in Kolbe did not misunderstand the “in common use at the time”
limitation or how the Supreme Court intended the word “unusual” to
function. In an order denying certiorari to the Friedman case, Justice
Thomas—joined by Justice Scalia who wrote the Heller opinion—
explained that the Seventh Circuit misread Heller and “flout[ed] two of [the
Court’s] Second Amendment precedents.”267 In other words, the Friedman
court erred because “[u]nder [the Court’s] precedents, [common use for
lawful purposes] is all that is needed for citizens to have a right under the
Second Amendment to keep such weapons.”268 The Kolbe court reiterated
the idea that common use or typical possession by the citizenry is the
hallmark of Second Amendment protection, not the “dangerous and
unusual” quality of the weapons alone.269 And, in Caetano, the Court
reaffirmed the importance of the common use at the time limitation and the
“dangerous and unusual” language.270 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Alito writes, “the pertinent Second Amendment inquiry is whether stun
guns are commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes
today.”271 Justice Alito also explored the Massachusetts state court’s
misapplication of the “dangerous and unusual” language and explained that
the court “defied Heller’s reasoning.”272

264. Id.
265. Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 194–95 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F.
App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem).
266. Id. at 177; id. at 194–95 (King, J., dissenting).
267. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (Thomas, J., dissenting), denying
cert. to 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015).
268. Id.
269. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 177–78.
270. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
271. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1032 (2016) (per curiam) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
272. Id. at 1030.
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Despite these alternative views, Kolbe hewed closest to
set forth in Heller.273 Future courts considering Second
challenges to firearms legislation should rely on Kolbe, not
others, because Kolbe construed “dangerous and unusual” as
Court intended.

[VOL. 76:487
the language
Amendment
Friedman or
the Supreme

B. The Fourth Circuit Correctly Mandated Strict Scrutiny,
Encouraging the Supreme Court to Resolve the Circuit Split and
Legislatures to Narrowly Tailor Future Firearms Legislation
In Kolbe, the Fourth Circuit correctly held that the Firearm Safety
Act’s assault weapon and large-capacity magazine bans should be analyzed
under strict scrutiny.274 The court grounded its determination in the “FirstAmendment-like” framework that the Fourth Circuit often employs for
challenges under the Second Amendment.275 Since the Firearm Safety Act
indiscriminately banned a class of firearms used for conduct at the core of
the Second Amendment, the court equated the law with one that
“foreclose[s] an entire medium of expression” in a First Amendment
context.276 Legislation that severely burdens a fundamental right must be
analyzed under strict scrutiny.277 Although the State argued that the
plaintiffs could possess other types of weapons to defend themselves, Kolbe
reinforced that courts cannot permit bans of entire classes of weapons
merely because other classes of weapons are available.278 The Fourth
Circuit’s holding appreciated that “the enshrinement of constitutional rights
necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”279 The Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms, just like the First Amendment
right to free speech, commands the judiciary’s protection. If courts subject
content-based speech regulations to strict scrutiny because those regulations
intrude upon the core First Amendment right, then blanket firearm bans that
intrude upon the core Second Amendment right, the law-abiding citizen’s
right to possess a firearm for self-defense, should also be subject to strict
scrutiny.280

273. See Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 194–95 (showing deference to key passages from Heller such as
“typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes” and the conjunctive phrase
“dangerous and unusual” and applying those passages in the same way the Court did in Heller).
274. Id. at 182.
275. Id. at 179 (citing United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010)).
276. Id. at 183 (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994)); see, e.g., Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414, 416 (1943) (holding that the First Amendment protects the door-to-door
distribution of literature from prohibition “at all times, at all places, and under all circumstances”).
277. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 181.
278. Id. at 180–81.
279. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
280. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (requiring strict scrutiny for a
town’s sign code that targeted speech based on its content).
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Kolbe was the first court of appeals to apply strict scrutiny to a
comprehensive assault weapon and large-capacity magazine ban.281 The
court acknowledged that other courts have applied intermediate scrutiny to
similar bans.282 In Friedman, the Seventh Circuit applied its own standard,
which the Kolbe court strongly criticized.283 A few courts have applied
strict scrutiny to other firearm regulations or in non-Second Amendment
cases,284 but intermediate scrutiny is the overwhelming standard of
choice.285 Many courts echo the sentiment “strict in theory, but fatal in
fact,” which implies that applying strict scrutiny will inevitably overturn the
law in question.286 But, as Justice O’Connor explained in Adarand
Constructors v. Pena,287 strict scrutiny is not, in fact, fatal.288 Rather, it is
designed to ensure that the legislature acts “within constitutional
constraints” by narrowly tailoring its means toward a compelling
governmental end.289
As the first court of appeals decision to conclude that strict scrutiny
should be applied to a provision of comprehensive firearms legislation,
Kolbe may influence Second Amendment jurisprudence outside of the
Fourth Circuit and gun regulations within the Fourth Circuit. First, courts
that have not yet addressed cases involving broad firearms legislation will
have to consider Kolbe’s strong endorsement of strict scrutiny when
analyzing similar bans. Heller left the appropriate level of heightened
scrutiny for firearms legislation open to interpretation by the lower
courts.290 Circuit courts of appeals have been reluctant to apply strict

281. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 196 (King, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 182; see, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261–62 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that
intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny is the appropriate heightened standard of review
for a comprehensive firearm statute).
283. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 182 (majority opinion).
284. See, e.g., United States v. Montalvo, No. 08-CR-004S, 2009 WL 595998, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009); United States v. Erwin, No. 1:07-CR-556 (LEK), 2008 WL 4534058,
at *5–6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008).
285. Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and McDonald, 70
MD. L. REV. 1131, 1145 (2011).
286. See e.g., Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 198 (King, J., dissenting) (quoting Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).
287. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
288. Id. at 237.
289. Id.
290. 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (referring generally to the fact that the law would satisfy “any”
of the standards of heightened scrutiny); cf. Richard C. Boldt, Decisional Minimalism and the
Judicial Evaluation of Gun Regulations, 71 MD. L. REV. 1177, 1178–82 (2012) (asserting that
Justice Scalia adopted a Burkean minimalist approach in the Heller opinion and left the
appropriate standard of scrutiny question open for judges to interpret based on “longstanding
settled practices and traditions”).
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scrutiny and have generally opted to apply intermediate scrutiny.291
Intermediate scrutiny permits courts to show greater deference to the
legislature than strict scrutiny in the process of upholding most firearms
legislation.292 Similarly, many courts have displayed a tendency to confine
Heller to its specific facts, which limits its application to handgun bans.293
Yet many of the same courts that apply intermediate scrutiny to firearm
regulations or cabin Heller’s holding to handgun bans subject laws that
infringe upon other enumerated constitutional rights to strict scrutiny.294
Kolbe is not mandatory authority outside of the Fourth Circuit, but it is
persuasive authority. In at least one case, lawyers filing Second
Amendment claims in the Tenth Circuit have already cited Kolbe in order to
persuade the court to apply strict scrutiny.295 Furthermore, Kolbe
challenges Friedman, a case that some viewed as the future direction of
Second Amendment jurisprudence.296 Friedman asked whether a firearm
regulation “bans weapons that were common at the time of ratification or
those that have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated [sic] militia’ . . . and whether law-abiding
citizens retain adequate means of self-defense.”297 Kolbe discussed some of
291. See Kiehl, supra note 285, at 1145 (“The majority of courts to announce a standard of
review have employed intermediate scrutiny, which is emerging as a clear favorite in the lower
courts for Second Amendment challenges.”); supra notes 174–174 and accompanying text.
292. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 260–61, 269 (2d Cir.
2015) (applying intermediate scrutiny and upholding an assault weapon ban); Woollard v.
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 868, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (same); Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1247, 1257
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (same); see also Kiehl, supra note 285, at 1142 (“[T]he only consistency in the
lower court cases is in the results. Regardless of the test used, challenged gun laws almost always
survive.” (quoting TINA MEHR & ADAM WINKLER, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, THE
STANDARDLESS SECOND AMENDMENT 1 (2010), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files
/Mehr_and_Winkler_Standardless_Second_Amendment.pdf)).
293. See, e.g., Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 448 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting), denying cert. to 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Instead of adhering to our reasoning in
Heller, the Seventh Circuit limited Heller to its facts . . . .”); see also Richard Re, Narrowing
Supreme Court Precedent From Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 962 (2016) (stating that some courts’
reasonable reluctance to apply the ruling in Heller led Justice Thomas to write dissents from
denials of certiorari criticizing this “apparent narrowing from below”).
294. See, e.g., State Emp. Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland, 718 F.3d 126, 133 (2d Cir.
2013) (holding that a state policy of only laying off union members interfered with the employees’
freedom to associate and was subject to strict scrutiny).
295. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 10–11, Bonidy v. United States Postal Serv., 790 F.3d
1121 (10th Cir.) (No. 15-746), 2016 WL 722179 (arguing that the court should consider Kolbe
and apply strict scrutiny), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1486 (2016) (mem).
296. See Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and the
Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1201–04 (2015) (citing
Friedman in support of the idea that the more “flexible” approach taken by lower courts has
doomed Heller’s reading of Second Amendment originalism and opened the door to an interestbalancing approach).
297. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
447 (2015) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622–25 (2008); and then citing
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1939)).
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the flaws in this standard of scrutiny that Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
identified in their dissent from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari for
Friedman.298 Specifically, Kolbe dismissed the Seventh Circuit’s approach
because it ignores the levels of scrutiny analysis in a way that “cannot be
reconciled with Heller.”299 Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari
in the Friedman case, the Court endorsed Kolbe’s view in the more recent
Caetano case by criticizing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s
decision to ban stun guns, labelling it incompatible with Heller’s extension
of Second Amendment protection to arms that were not in existence at the
time of the founding.300 Thus, other courts must seriously consider Kolbe
and its arguments when determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to
apply to sweeping firearms legislation.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Kolbe will produce firearms
legislation that offers greater protection to the right to keep and bear arms.
Kolbe has influenced Second Amendment jurisprudence by creating a
circuit split301 regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny for a Second
Amendment analysis, which may compel the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari to a case involving a firearm ban.302 All circuit courts of appeals
up until Kolbe addressing challenges to comprehensive firearms legislation
applied intermediate scrutiny.303 In late 2015, before Kolbe was decided,
the Supreme Court declined to expound on the scrutiny question it left open
in Heller by denying certiorari in the Friedman case.304 Following Kolbe,
legal commentators and news articles have predicted that the Supreme
Court will grant certiorari to a case involving comprehensive firearms
legislation in order to rectify the circuit split.305

298. Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 182–83 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F.
App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem) (majority opinion).
299. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 182.
300. 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016) (per curiam) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (“[The
Massachusetts stun gun ban is] inconsistent with Heller’s clear statement that the Second
Amendment ‘extends . . . to . . . arms . . . that were not in existence at the time of the
founding.’”)).
301. Compare N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 260–61 (2d Cir.
2015) (applying intermediate scrutiny to an assault weapon ban), and Friedman, 784 F.3d at 410
(applying a standard requiring protected weapons to have a reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia to an assault weapon ban), with Kolbe, 813
F.3d at 182 (applying strict scrutiny to an assault weapon ban).
302. See, e.g., Eric Hansford, Measuring The Effects of Specialization with Circuit Split
Reviews, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1145, 1152–53 (explaining that the Supreme Court typically takes
cases from the courts of appeals to settle a disagreement among the circuits).
303. Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 196 (King, J., dissenting).
304. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 447 (2015), denying cert. to 784 F.3d
406 (7th Cir. 2015)
305. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Are Assault Weapons Protected by the Second Amendment?,
(Feb.
5,
2016,
3:14
PM),
SLATE
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/02/the_supreme_court_may_
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Now may be a particularly opportune time for the Supreme Court to
decide what level of scrutiny should be applied in Second Amendment
challenges. Gun control legislation played a prominent role in the national
political conversation during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.306 Cities
and states will likely continue to pass, or at least propose, assault weapon
bans in light of recent, high profile shootings, often committed with
automatic or semi-automatic weapons.307 Assuming that the Supreme Court
does not pull back from Heller, where the Court insisted that the Second
Amendment legislation must satisfy heightened scrutiny, it might
specifically endorse either intermediate or strict scrutiny.308 If the Court
champions strict scrutiny, then the fundamental, constitutional right to keep
and bear arms for self-defense will be accorded greater protection by all
courts.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court and
instructed the court to apply strict scrutiny in order to decide whether or not
the Firearm Safety Act is constitutional.309 On remand, the district court
could conclude that the Firearm Safety Act, when examined through a lens
of strict scrutiny, violates the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms. If the district court does hold the act unconstitutional, Maryland and
the other states within the Fourth Circuit will have to change their approach

finally_have_to_take_a_new_gun_case.html (considering the idea that we may see a “high court
showdown” involving the Supreme Court and comprehensive gun legislation following Kolbe).
306. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, The Final Trump-Clinton Debate Transcript, Annotated, WASH.
POST (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/19/the-finaltrump-clinton-debate-transcript-annotated/ (transcribing the third, televised debate between
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign, during which the
candidates discussed, among other topics, gun regulation and comprehensive background checks).
307. In particular, the tragic shooting in an Orlando nightclub on June 12, 2016, provoked a
groundswell of support for assault weapon bans. See Christopher Ingraham, Support for Assault
Weapons Ban Surges Following Orlando Shooting, WASH. POST (June 15, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/06/15/something-might-be-changing-afterorlando-americans-suddenly-want-to-ban-assault-weapons/ (describing the rise in the number of
Americans who support a nationwide assault weapon ban following the shooting in the Pulse
nightclub); Gary Rohrer, GOP, Democrats Still Battle over Gun Control in Florida, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (June 17, 2016, 5:55 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/pulse-orlandonightclub-shooting/politics/os-orlando-shooting-gun-control-legislature-20160617-story.html
(describing the debate over increased gun control in the Florida legislature following the Orlando
shooting). The Orlando shooter used a semi-automatic pistol and semi-automatic rifle to kill
forty-nine people and injure fifty-three more, marking the deadliest mass shooting in American
history. Hayley Tsukayama, Mark Berman & Jerry Markon, Gunman Who Killed 49 in Orlando
Nightclub Had Pledged Allegiance to ISIS, WASH. POST (June 13, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/06/12/orlando-nightclub-shootingabout-20-dead-in-domestic-terror-incident-at-gay-club/.
308. Strict scrutiny is one of the types of heightened scrutiny that the Court permitted lower
courts to apply following Heller and McDonald. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 628 (2008) (disqualifying rational-basis scrutiny only).
309. Id. at 168. But see supra note 13 (explaining that the Fourth Circuit must issue an en
banc opinion first that could prevent the case from being remanded).
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to firearms legislation.310 Presumably, future gun regulations will need to
be narrower to allow law-abiding citizens to possess firearms, including
semi-automatic weapons, within their homes for the purpose of selfdefense.311
IV. CONCLUSION
In Kolbe v. Hogan, the Fourth Circuit held that semi-automatic rifles
and large-capacity magazines were protected under the Second Amendment
and that a total prohibition of these weapons should be analyzed under strict
scrutiny.312 The court reached the correct conclusion in this case, partly
because its accurate interpretation of the “dangerous and unusual” standard
set forth in Heller should assist future courts facing Second Amendment
challenges.313 Furthermore, the court properly decided Kolbe because it
determined that comprehensive assault weapon and large-capacity
magazine bans like the Firearm Safety Act’s must be evaluated under the
standard of strict scrutiny.314 The Fourth Circuit’s application of strict
scrutiny implores future courts to seriously consider Kolbe’s arguments for
strict scrutiny in the context of broad firearms legislation and could pressure
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to a similar Second Amendment
challenge in the next few years.315 In addition, if on remand the district
court finds the Firearm Safety Act unconstitutional, state legislatures within
the Fourth Circuit will need to pass narrower firearm regulations that
safeguard the right to keep and bear arms.316

310. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 922–23, 927 (2010) (Breyer J.,
dissenting) (asserting that state legislatures must consider firearm case law when devising gun
regulations).
311. See Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 183 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F.
App’x. 880 (4th Cir. 2016) (mem) (noting that the Firearm Safety Act goes beyond regulation into
total prohibition and implying that Maryland’s legislature should have tempered this absolute
prohibition).
312. Id. at 168.
313. See supra Part IV.A.
314. See supra Part IV.A.
315. See supra Part IV.B.
316. See supra Part IV.B.

